Framing Signals

a return to portable shellcode

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stack buffer overflow



stack buffer overflow



stack buffer overflow



stack buffer overflow



stack buffer overflow



stack buffer overflow




stack
return addr
sp
buffer


stack
return addr
sp
buffer
code

return oriented programming / ret2libc



return oriented programming / ret2libc



Return Oriented Programming

- dependent on available gadgets
- chains may differ greatly between different binaries
- non-trivial to program
- ASLR makes it harder to guess gadgets without an info-leak

Sigreturn Oriented Programming

- minimal number of gadgets
- constructing shellcode by chaining system calls
- easy to change functionality of shellcode
- gadgets are always present

unix signals



unix signals

stack

unix signals



unix signals



unix signals



unix signals

good:

kernel agnostic about signal handlers



unix signals

bad:

kernel agnostic about signal handlers

(we can fake 'em)



two gadgets

- call to sigreturn
- syscall & return


forged signal frame
sigreturn


program counter
forged signal frame
sigreturn


program counter
stack pointer
forged signal frame
sigreturn


program counter
stack pointer
RAX
...
RDI
RSI
RDX
R10
R8
R9
...
sigreturn


program counter
stack pointer
syscall number
...
arg1
arg2
arg3
arg4
arg5
arg6
...
sigreturn


syscall & return
stack pointer
syscall number
...
arg1
arg2
arg3
arg4
arg5
arg6
...
sigreturn


syscall & return
next sigframe
syscall number
...
arg1
arg2
arg3
arg4
arg5
arg6
...
sigreturn


next
syscall(...)


socket()
bind()
listen()
accept()
execve()


parent
clone(...)


parent
clone(...)
child


clone()
(wait)

usage scenarios

- stealthy backdoor
- code signing circumvention
- generic shellcode for exploitation

usage scenarios

- **stealthy backdoor**
- code signing circumvention
- generic shellcode for exploitation

stealthy backdoor

basic idea:

- use the inotify API to wait for a file to be read

- when this file is read: open a listen socket to spawn a shell

- terminate the listening socket quickly if nobody connects

backdoor



backdoor


close()
inotify_init()
inotify_add_watch()
read()
clone()
alarm()
close()
close()
socket()
setsockopt()
bind()
listen()
accept()
dup2()
alarm()
execve()

usage scenarios

- stealthy backdoor
- **code signing circumvention**
- generic shellcode for exploitation

code signing circumvention

- serialize system calls over a socket
- write into our own signal frames

useful to bypass code-signing restrictions

system call proxy



system call proxy



and... It's turing complete

usage scenarios

- stealthy backdoor
- code signing circumvention
- generic shellcode for exploitation

SROP exploit on x86-64

we have:

- a stack buffer overflow
- not a single gadget from the binary

assumption:

- we can guess/leak the location of a writable address (any address!)

- we have some control over RAX (function's return value)

two gadgets

- call to sigreturn
- syscall & return

two gadgets

- call to sigreturn: RAX = 15 + syscall
- syscall & return

one gadget

- RAX = 15
- syscall & return

[vsyscall]

[vsyscall]

```
ffffffffff600000  48 c7 c0 60 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc gettimeofday()
ffffffffff60010  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600400  48 c7 c0 c9 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc time()
ffffffffff600410  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600800  48 c7 c0 35 01 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc getcpu()
ffffffffff600810  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff601000
```

[vsyscall]

```
ffffffffff600000  48 c7 c0 60 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc gettimeofday()
ffffffffff60010  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600400  48 c7 c0 c9 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc time()
ffffffffff600410  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600800  48 c7 c0 35 01 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc getcpu()
ffffffffff600810  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff601000
```

[vsyscall]

```
ffffffffff600000  48 c7 c0 60 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc gettimeofday()
ffffffffff60010  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600400  48 c7 c0 c9 00 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc time()
ffffffffff600410  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff600800  48 c7 c0 35 01 00 00 0f  05 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc getcpu()
ffffffffff600810  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
*
ffffffffff601000
```

0f05 syscall
c3 return

```
syscall(arg1, arg2, arg3, ...) = result
```

```
execve("/bin/sh",
       ["/bin/sh", "-c", "...", NULL],
       NULL)
```

```
execve("/bin/sh",
       ["/bin/sh", "-c", "...", NULL],
       NULL)
```

```
syscall(arg1, arg2, arg3, ...) = result
```

```
read(fd, addr, ...) = result
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, ...) = result
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
     RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
```

RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs

top of stack points to syscall & return

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
     RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
     top of stack points to syscall & return
syncfs(fd) = ...
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
     RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
     top of stack points to syscall & return
syncfs(fd) = 0
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306
```

RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
top of stack points to syscall & return

```
syncfs(fd) = 0
```

RAX == 0 == __NR_read
top of stack points to syscall & return

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306

    RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
    top of stack points to syscall & return

syncfs(fd) = 0

    RAX == 0 == __NR_read
    top of stack points to syscall & return

read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = ...
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306

    RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
    top of stack points to syscall & return

syncfs(fd) = 0

    RAX == 0 == __NR_read
    top of stack points to syscall & return

read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 15
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306

    RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
    top of stack points to syscall & return

syncfs(fd) = 0

    RAX == 0 == __NR_read
    top of stack points to syscall & return

read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 15

    RAX == 15 == __NR_rt_sigreturn
    top of stack points to syscall & return
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306

    RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
    top of stack points to syscall & return

syncfs(fd) = 0

    RAX == 0 == __NR_read
    top of stack points to syscall & return

read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 15

    RAX == 15 == __NR_rt_sigreturn
    top of stack points to syscall & return

mprotect(stack_addr, 0x1000,
         PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC)
```

```
read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 306

    RAX == 306 == __NR_syncfs
    top of stack points to syscall & return

syncfs(fd) = 0

    RAX == 0 == __NR_read
    top of stack points to syscall & return

read(fd, stack_addr, 306) = 15

    RAX == 15 == __NR_rt_sigreturn
    top of stack points to syscall & return

mprotect(stack_addr, 0x1000,
         PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC)

    top of stack points to our code
```

CVE-2012-5976 (asterisk)

On some systems SROP gadgets are randomised, on others, they are not

Operating system	Gadget	Memory map
Linux i386	sigreturn	[vdso]
Linux < 3.11 ARM	sigreturn	[vectors] 0xffff0000
Linux < 3.3 x86-64	syscall & return	[vsyscall] 0xffffffffff600000
Linux ≥ 3.3 x86-64	syscall & return	Libc
Linux x86-64	sigreturn	Libc
FreeBSD 9.2 x86-64	sigreturn	0x7fffffff000
Mac OSX x86-64	sigreturn	Libc
iOS ARM	sigreturn	Libsystem
iOS ARM	syscall & return	Libsystem

On some systems SROP gadgets are randomised, on others, they are not

android

non-ASLR :-(

Operating system	Gadget	Memory map
Linux i386	sigreturn	[vdso]
Linux < 3.11 ARM	sigreturn	[vectors] 0xffff0000
Linux < 3.3 x86-64	syscall & return	[vsyscall] 0xffffffffff600000
Linux ≥ 3.3 x86-64	syscall & return	Libc
Linux x86-64	sigreturn	Libc
FreeBSD 9.2 x86-64	sigreturn	0x7fffffff000
Mac OSX x86-64	sigreturn	Libc
iOS ARM	sigreturn	Libsystem
iOS ARM	syscall & return	Libsystem

questions?

mitigation:

It may be useful to disable vsyscall

vsyscall=emulate
(default from Linux 3.3 onward)

or

vsyscall=none

mitigation:

- Signal frame canaries


stack canary
stack
return addr
buffer
sp


stack canary
stack
return addr
buffer
sp


program counter
stack pointer
RAX
...
RDI
RSI
RDX
R10
R8
R9
sigreturn


program counter
stack pointer
RAX
...
RDI
RSI
RDX
R10
R8
R9
sigreturn

mitigation:

- Signal frame canaries

mitigation:

- Signal frame canaries

- Counting signals in progress

CVE-2012-5976 (asterisk)





CVE-2012-5976 (asterisk)



CVE-2012-5976 (asterisk)




dispatch load CODE
dispatch jmp
exit
cond jump
jump
P = P + c
*P = *P + c
*P=getchar()
putchar(*P)
store

```
code = open("/proc/self/mem",O_RDWR);
p = open("/proc/self/mem",O_RDWR);
a = open("/proc/self/mem",O_RDWR);
```

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instruction dispatch:
  read(code, &ucontext.sp, sizeof(long));
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  read(code, &ucontext.sp, sizeof(long));

pointer ops:
  p++ -> lseek(p, 1, SEEK_CUR);

addition:
  lseek(a, &identity_table_x2, SEEK_SET);
  lseek(a, val1, SEEK_SET);
  lseek(a, val2, SEEK_SET);
  read(a, dest, 1);
```