A Multi-OS Cross-Layer Study of Bloating in User Programs, Kernel and Managed Execution Environments

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ABSTRACT

We present a study of bloating across the software stack. We study user-level programs, OS kernels and Java virtual machine. We employ: (1) static measurements to detect limits to debloating, and (2) dynamic measurements to detect how much of the code available to a program is utilized under typical payloads. We incorporate an ultra-light weight tracing procedure in a whole-system emulator to measure the bloat in kernel. We measure the amount of kernel code that executes during the boot process and during the execution of popular system calls. Our findings show that bloating is pervasive and severe. A significant fraction of code across the software stack is never executed and provides scope for debloating.

1 INTRODUCTION

Traditional software development favors modular and "plug-andplay" mode of development wherein, code is well organized into reusable modules and/or functions. Whenever a functionality is required, the module is loaded and made available to the user. Such a model presents multiple benefits. First, by reusing as much of existing code as possible, the overall development time is reduced. Second, because the code is repeatedly used, bugs in the code are discovered in a timely manner.

By design, abstractions are generic and contain code that services multiple clients. For example, shared library libc contains multiple functionalities that service a wide variety of programs. Similarly, the Java runtime and the Python interpreter support a full feature set of the respective languages irrespective of whether a program uses (or not) those features. Same is the case with the Linux kernel. For example Linux supports 100s of system calls, although a majority of those system calls are not used by a majority of programs.

Bloating occurs when more-than-necessary amount of code is present in the memory, and can have detrimental impact. First, there is the overhead of having to manage the unwanted code. Second, any vulnerabilities in the unwanted code become active points of potentially exploitable weaknesses. Finally, if/when software is compromised, the unwanted code can be utilized by an attacker (e.g., in code-reuse attacks) to abuse the system.

ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5395-3/17/11...\$15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3141235.3141242 Bloating can occur at multiple levels in the execution stack—typically across layers of abstraction.

- User-level Programs: User-level programs are designed to perform specific tasks. However, these programs rely on code (open or closed source) that are modularized to contain specific (e.g., libgsl.so: GNU scientific library) or generic (e.g., libc.so: C library for IO, signal handling, string handling, etc.) functionalities. There are multiple causes why these programs can be bloated. First, they could be subjected to bad coding practices wherein developers make copies of code for convenience. Next, they inherit bloat from generic libraries such as libc that they depend on. These libraries pack several functionalities, several of which are never used by the user program. Understanding how these programs use the code available to them is key to designing solutions to eliminate bloat.
- **OS Kernel:** Kernels are complex system software with strong interconnected components such as memory and process management, and IO. They perform several functions that are critical for regular operations in a system. While there has been significant debate on the design philosophy for kernels [6], modern Linux kernels are primarily monolithic with support for loadable kernel modules. Moreover the size of the Linux kernel has grown from several kilobytes to megabytes. Even for simple tasks, within the kernel context of execution, large amounts of sensitive code is available in the form of bloat. Understanding code utility in the kernel will aid in development of kernels with low sensitive code footprint.
- Managed Execution: Execution engines such as the Java virtual machine and Python interpreter are user programs that interpret and execute special code (e.g., Java byte code). While the execution runtime supports a multitude of functionalities, managed programs may use a fraction of functionalities. As such, the execution environment is usually in a bloated state. The layer of abstraction to interpret the bytecode necessitates generality, which in turn forms the basis for bloat.
- Hardware: Bloat is not restricted to software. Modern hardware are packed with several features (e.g., MPX, Intel SGX) that are seldom used by regular programs. However, if/when a program is compromised, these hardware features become available to an attacker and may be utilized to abuse the system. From the perspective of a program being executed, the hardware is therefore bloated.

In this paper, we present a study on bloating that spans userlevel programs, OS kernels and managed execution environments such as Java runtime and the Python interpreter. Our goal is to

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FEAST'17, November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA

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understand how much of code in the memory is used for average or typical work loads under different settings.

For the user-level programs and the managed execution environments, we pursue two approaches. In the first static approach, we statically examine user-level programs to determine the lower bound to bloat. That is, *what is the minimum amount of code in the program's memory that is never going to execute?* This is an under approximation of how bloated a program's memory is. For example, if the C library is loaded into a program's memory, and if we can statically verify that the program uses just one function (say printf) in libc, then the remainder of code other than printf and its dependencies contribute to bloat. In the second dynamic approach, we execute the program in a controlled execution environment and measure the amount of code that actually executes when the program is subjected to various payloads. In essence, we seek to answer the question: *how much of a program's code executes for typical payloads on a program?*

In order to study the bloat in OS kernels, we execute the kernel in an emulated environment and measure the amount of kernel code that actually executes.

2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

2.1 Measuring Bloat Statically

For the user-level programs (i.e., browsers, media players, databases, etc.) we perform two levels of evaluation. First, we employ static binary analysis to determine the lower bound for bloat. Specifically, for each program of interest, we start from the program executable and recursively traverse through program dependencies (i.e., shared libraries) to generate a program-wide function call graph. This is achieved by using the import table of the executable. Then, for each function in the call graph, we disassemble the function and compute the number of bytes of code in the function. We use IDApro to disassemble the executable and individual libraries. Summation of all the code in all the functions in program-wide call graph forms the upper bound to the amount of code the program can execute. Any code in memory outside the call graph is bloat. The lower bound for bloat (i.e., minimum amount of bloat in the program) is the amount of code in the memory that is not executed by the program.

Here, any code in the main executable itself is deemed necessary. Note that such an assumption is not far fetched because the compiler typically eliminates code in the executable that is not reachable.

Indirect code references: Branches to certain indirect code references (e.g., function pointers, C++ virtual function targets) are accomplished using indirect branch instructions, and therefore will not appear as dependencies in the call graph. During static determination, we take a conservative approach and include all the address-taken functions in the program as potential targets. We do this by extracting all immediate values in the memory that correspond to valid function addresses. We include such functions as required functions.

Note that the code from call graph in addition with code from address-taken functions gives an over approximation of code the

program *may* execute. However, in practice, the code that is executed is much smaller than this theoretical limit. Therefore, this forms the lower bound for the amount of bloat in the program.

2.2 Average Case Runtime Bloat Determination

We also conduct experiments to determine the amount of bloat a program exhibits in the average use case. Here, our goal is to find out how much of the program code actually executes when subjected to typical payloads. The remainder code in the memory is bloat for that particular instance of execution. That is, we wish to answer the question: *How much of code in the memory typically executes*? The answer to this question will shed light on different ways a program can be debloated so as to minimize the attack surface available to an attacker.

To determine the runtime bloat, we execute the program within a carefully controlled execution monitor. We then subject the program to different types of payloads that the program would typically encounter during normal use. For example, we tested browser applications in our test set by loading Alexa's [1] top 10 websites. We also manually explored different menu items to trigger commonlyencountered code paths. Note that our intention is not to exhaustively test the program to explore all code paths. But rather, we wish to capture the typical usage scenarios of the program in order to determine popular code paths. Next, we record the unique instructions executed by the program. Given the total amount of code loaded in the memory, we can compute the percentage of code that executes on typical payloads, and consequently bloat.



Figure 1: Overview of bloat measurement in the kernel.

2.3 Measuring Bloat in the Kernel

As a sensitive piece of system software, bloat in kernel could severely impact security. We therefore aim to measure the amount of bloat in the kernel. Unlike regular programs, measuring bloat in the kernel is hard. One approach would be to obtain an execution trace of the kernel using a full-system emulator (e.g., DECAF [8]), and to examine the footprint to estimate bloat. However, subjecting kernel to even a coarse-grained introspection leads to prohibitive performance overhead that makes experiments impractical.

For our evaluation we modify Qemu, a full system dynamic translator. Unlike regular tracing where the program state must be acquired at regular intervals, we are only interested in identifying the code that was executed in the kernel. We design an ultra-light weight execution tracer that records only the code that was executed within the kernel context. The overview of our measurement system is presented in Figure 1. In a nutshell, like most other dynamic translators (e.g., DynamoRIO and Intel's Pin), Qemu maintains a translation code cache. Whenever any code (kernel or user) must be executed, during the first instance, it is translated into a "Translation Block" (TB) and is maintained within the translation cache. Each TB is analogous to a basic block in the code. This one time transformation is key to the performance benefits of the emulator.

We intercept the translation stage in Qemu and whenever a TB is generated, we record the virtual address and size of the code that corresponds to the TB. Next, we filter the blocks that correspond to the kernel address region to identify kernel code that was executed. Note that this is different from regular tracing because unlike regular tracing (e.g., DECAF [8]), the TBs themselves are unmodified and we do not frequently seek CPU state. As an additional benefit, such an approach allows us to measure multiple kernels without any modification to the measurement code.

We make two specific measurements:

- (1) Boot Process: We seek to evaluate how much of the kernel code actually executes during the boot process. This information will help determine the attack surface available for malware that target the boot process. In this case, we gather all the kernel code that was executed irrespective of the process context under which the execution occurred.
- (2) *System calls and bloat:* We seek to evaluate the footprint of different system calls in the kernel. User programs interact with the kernel through system calls. Therefore, by examining the footprint of commonly used system calls in the kernel, we can estimate the amount of kernel code that typically executes during program execution. This also reveals the scope to debloat the kernel. In order to measure the system calls, we:
 - (a) We run a synthetic program that invokes specific system call(s).
 - (b) Upon reaching the entry point of the program, we clear the translation cache. That is, we delete all the TBs to force translation of any future code. This process ensures that any system calls executed by the loader are excluded.
 - (c) We record the kernel code that resulted in emission of TBs, and stop recording when the servicing of system call completes.

Translation cache is a per-CPU data structure. Therefore, to eliminate interference due to kernel code execution from another process context, we use the CR3 register to filter the code that corresponds to the synthetic program we created. Because the CR3 register uniquely represents a process context, we retrieve the kernel code that executed in the context of our synthetic program.

2.4 Measuring Bloat in Execution Engines

We aim to measure the amount of code in the runtime/interpreter that is actually triggered during the execution of typical languagespecific programs. We subject Java virtual machine and Python interpreter to different—typical—payloads and measure the amount of code that executes during the execution of a Java/Python program. Next, we identify the code in runtime that is common to multiple payloads. This gives us the core component of the runtime that is exercised during a typical execution (e.g., bytecode reader). We hope to obtain a sense of how much code exists in the runtime vis-a-vis the amount of code that is needed for typical program execution.

3 RESULTS

Test Set: Our test set comprises of a wide range of programs ranging from complex browsers (e.g., Firefox), media player (vlc), compilers (clang++, g++), text editors (sublime), and utility programs (make). For the kernels, we pick Debian Wheezy FreeBSD 64bit, Debian Wheezy AMD 64bit, and Windows 8.1 OSes. We use the Java virtual machine (JDK 1.8.0) and Python interpreter 2.7.6 to evaluate bloating in managed execution engines.

3.1 Bloating in User-Level Programs

Static measurement of bloat—lower bound. The results of our static measurement experiments are presented in Table 1. As an average overestimate (as described in Section 4.1), programs in our test set require only 65% of the code in the libraries and 73% of the code including the libraries and the executable. Chrome is an exceptional case where the executable is relatively large and contributes a large amount of code to the overall code in the memory. While all the libraries loaded by Chrome add up to 4.04 million instructions, chrome.exe alone accounts for 28.3 million instructions. On average, only 36% of functions in the memory are used by programs. This indicates that there exists space for research on optimal code organization within modules. For example, we may be able to group frequently used functions across different libraries into a single library so as to reduce the overall bloat across programs.

Dynamic measurement of bloat for typical loads. We ran the programs in our test set on Pin, a dynamic translator, and we examined the execution profile of the programs. Results are tabulated in Table 2. Programs were subjected workloads that the programs are typically run on (column 2). Only about 21% (average) of code in the memory executes for typical payloads, which corresponds to 12.12% of functions. Note that even a heavy program like firefox executes less than 30% of code. That is, most of the code is never executed in most of the cases. This provides us with insights on potential approaches to debloat in a context-specific manner (more in Section 4.2).

3.2 Bloating in Kernel

Below, we present our findings from kernel experiments. The overall kernel code in our study includes code in the kernel and all the loaded kernel modules.

Boot time code execution. We measured the fraction of kernel code that was executed during the boot process. Our results are tabulated in Table 3. In each case, we monitored the unique TBs that were created between the system being turned on and the login prompt being displayed to the user. Across three kernels tested, on

Table 1: Static bloat measurement. LIR: Percentage of instructions in all the dependent libraries that a program *may* execute. OIR: Percentage of instructions in all the libraries + executable that a program *may* execute. LFR: Percentage of functions in all the dependent libraries that a program *may* execute. OFR: Percentage of functions in all the libraries + executable that a program *may* execute.

| Duagnam | % Library Instructions | % Overall Instructions | % Library Functions | % Overall Functions |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Frogram | Required (LIR) | Required (OIR) | Required (LFR) | Required (OFR) |
| firefox | 67.20% | 68.37% | 36.42% | 38.60% |
| chrome | 69.72% | 95.67% | 33.57% | 36.75% |
| webbrowser-app | 58.86% | 59.03% | 29.34% | 30.22% |
| vlc | 78.22% | 78.25% | 42.44% | 42.79% |
| rhythmbox | 77.92% | 77.92% | 29.83% | 29.83% |
| evince | 70.84% | 71.34% | 33.61% | 36.19% |
| sublime | 68.88% | 84.95% | 39.13% | 41.42% |
| gnome calculator | 68.59% | 69.21% | 34.02% | 36.18% |
| git | 62.70% | 78.11% | 22.75% | 29.11% |
| clang | 53.99% | 73.91% | 34.32% | 56.83% |
| g++ | 52.36% | 64.37% | 23.90% | 29.58% |
| make | 52.13% | 56.06% | 23.11% | 27.75% |
| Average | 65.11% | 73.01% | 31.87% | 36.27% |

Table 2: Runtime bloat measurement. Percentage of code executed in user-level programs for typical usage. For each programs, we list the number of shared libraries loaded, % of library instructions executed, % instructions in process executed, % library functions executed, and number of unique system calls invoked by both program and shared libraries.

| Program | Workload | #Libraries loaded | % Instructions Executed in Libraries | % Overall Instructions Executed | % Functions Executed in Libraries | #Syscalls |
|------------------|---|----------------------|--|------------------------------------|---|-----------|
| firefox | Open top 10 websites in Alexa list | 146 | 28.66% | 28.70% | 17.04% | 101 |
| webbrowser-app | Open google.com. Open and play a video youtube.com. | 182 | 12.70% | 12.76% | 15.28% | 93 |
| vlc | Play 1 song | 681 | 12.44% | 12.44% | 10.54% | 80 |
| libreoffice | Create, write and save a new word file. | 191 | 23.41% | 23.41% | 16.03% | 86 |
| sublime | Create, write and save a new word file. | 77 | 26.66% | 38.12% | 16.85 | 67 |
| gnome-calculator | Add and subtract numbers. | 81 | 35.18% | 36.25% | 21.35% | 59 |
| git | Clone a respository | 41 | 12.61% | 11.78% | 6.71% | 47 |
| clang++ | Compile a C++ program | 10 | 6.63% | 10.32% | 8.62 | 23 |
| g++ | Compile a C++ program | 9 | 4.52% | 17.57% | 2.53% | 17 |
| make | Run make on a C++ project. | 9 | 11.97% | 18.20% | 6.22% | 26 |
| Average | | | 17.48% | 20.96% | 12.12% | 59.9 |

average only 31.25% of the kernel code executes during the boot process.

System-call-specific code execution. We also measured the kernel code that is invoked within individual system calls that are frequently used in Linux [16]. Our findings are tabulated in Table 4. Most system calls exercise under 10% of kernel code.

3.3 Bloating in Managed Execution Engines

We also measured the bloat in Java Virtual Machine and Python interpreter. Specifically, for JVM, we ran Java programs and examined the footprint in the JVM. For Python, we ran five programs and recorded the interpreter and shared library code that was executed. Our findings are tabulated in Table 5 and Table 6. Our results show that only about 30% of functions and (32%) of code is executed in the JVM.

| Operating | Code Executed | Kernel | % Kernel Code | |
|-----------------|------------------|----------|------------------|--|
| System | During | Size (B) | Executed | |
| | Boot (B) | | During Boot | |
| Debian Wheezy | 2192166 | 7494595 | 29.25% | |
| kFreeBSD Wheezy | 2445095 | 10556370 | 23.16% | |
| Windows 8.1 | 1112279 | 2691056 | 41.33% | |
| Average | 1916513 | 6914007 | 31.25% | |

 Table 3: Percentage of kernel code executed at boot time

Table 4: Percentage of code executed in kernel space inkFreeBSD and Debian for popular system calls.

| | Kernel Co | de | % Kernel Code | | |
|-------------|------------|---------|---------------|--------|--|
| System Call | Executed (| B) | Executed | | |
| | kFreeBSD | Debian | kFreeBSD | Debian | |
| exit | 941961 | 778361 | 8.92% | 7.89% | |
| ovit group | Not | 462053 | Not | 4.68% | |
| exit_group | Supported | 402033 | Supported | | |
| open | 1076732 | 964614 | 10.20% | 0789 | |
| + close | 1070732 | 904014 | 10.20% | 9.70% | |
| getuid | 792612 | 575879 | 7.51% | 5.84% | |
| execve | 1453331 | 1388650 | 13.77% | 14.07% | |
| getcwd | 681763 | 903860 | 6.46% | 9.16% | |
| write | 792519 | 713358 | 7.51% | 7.23% | |
| getpid | 670177 | 533857 | 6.35% | 5.41% | |
| Average | 938293 | 803343 | 8.89% | 8.14% | |

Table 5: Bloating in Java programs.

| | | # | % | % |
|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|-----------|
| Program | Workload | Modules | Instructions | Functions |
| | | in JVM | Executed | Executed |
| F -1: | Create, | | | |
| | compile, | 6 | 10.50% | 25.13% |
| Lenpse | and execute | 8 | 33.65% | 35.45% |
| | a program | | | |
| Jabref | Create a | | | |
| | bibliography | 13 | 31.88% | 30.42% |
| | file | | | |
| Jenkins | Install | | | |
| | plugins, | 12 | | |
| | create an | | 34.51% | 32.39% |
| | admin user, | | | |
| | and create | | | |
| | a pipeline | | | |
| Average | | 10 | 27.63% | 30.85% |

4 DEBLOATING-APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES

We explore two approaches to debloating—a static and a runtime approach.

| | | # | % | % |
|-----------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
| Program | Workload | Modules | Instructions | Functions |
| - | | in python | Executed | Executed |
| Calibre | Open and | 34 | 6.75% | 4.97% |
| | read a book | 34 | 7.08% | 7.66% |
| Mercurial | Clone | 4 | 39.76% | 69.23% |
| | a repository | 6 | 40.84% | 44.44% |
| Din | Install a | 11 | 14.52% | 60.49% |
| PIp | package | 11 | 9.21% | 60.49% |
| Ubuntu | Install | 2 | 11.33% | 53.85% |
| software | and remove | 16 | 32.75% | 14.32% |
| center | a program | 17 | 44.88% | 30.07% |
| Gramps | Create | | | |
| | a family | 8 | 54.25% | 36.67% |
| | tree | | | |
| Average | | 14 | 26.14% | 38.22% |

4.1 Static Approach

In the first approach, we could determine the static dependencies for a program and ensure that remaining code is eliminated from the memory. In this approach, we would first identify the static bloat using the technique described in Section 3.1, and then employ a late-stage component (e.g., a modified loader) that would selectively eliminate unwanted functionality. The main advantage of such an approach is that it imposes near-zero runtime overhead (except for the one-time load overhead).

Challenges: There are multiple challenges that need addressing. First, the static dependencies must be complete to prevent runtime errors. In our approach, we take a conservative approach to obtain the overestimate of the amount of code required by the program. While this guarantees correctness, it does not yield optimal debloating. Precise analysis will be needed to achieve optimal debloating. Such an analysis is known to be hard especially for binaries. Second, language-specific details must be specifically handled. For example, the virtual function targets in C++ are obtained from a class-specific table called the VTable. A precise analysis must be object-sensitive in order to handle C++ code and precisely identify the potential targets for virtual function calls. Similar challenges exist for execution engines like Java and Python. Third, modules can be loaded during the program runtime (e.g., using dlopen) or code may be generated during runtime through Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation. These code modules may exhibit dependencies on code that has already been removed. Special handling is required to handle such JIT code. Failure to handle such cases will result in undesirable program crashes. Finally, selectively disabling/removing code from the memory will hinder code sharing. Shared code is typically memory-mapped into multiple address spaces and a single physical copy is loaded into the memory. Due to copy-on-write, deleting a copy in memory for one process will force duplication of data, which could in turn hinder performance. Special handling will be needed to allow code sharing without significant performance impact.

4.2 Dynamic Approach

More ambitious debloating can be achieved through a dynamic approach that is context sensitive. In essence, the actual code that the program requires to process a given input is known upon concretion of input. That is, when the concrete input is known, the precise dependencies can be computed for that input. Therefore, for that input, other code in the memory is unwanted and can therefore be safely removed/disabled. This approach is context sensitive and requires a runtime component that selectively enables and disables functionality in the memory depending on the program input. On the one hand, such a technique has potential for high level of precision whereas it imposes runtime overhead due to the per-input interception performed by the runtime component. Analogous approaches have been experimented upon in the context of CFI [7, 11].

Challenges: A key challenge in dynamic approach is to contain the runtime overhead imposed by the solution. Additionally, challenges faced by static approach (JIT code, code sharing, language specific challenges) are also faced by the dynamic approach.

Additionally, debloating closed-source executables requires analyzing the binary, which is hard. Correct disassembly, accurate control-flow graph recovery, correct binary instrumentation, etc. are all practical challenges faced in binary analysis, and must be solved in order to successfully debloat binaries.

5 RELATED WORK

Managed programing languages suffer from significant runtime overhead or bloating due to the extra logic added to manage the execution environment. On the one hand, Xu et al.[17] and Bu et al.[4] delegate the debloating task to developers, classifying this problem as purely software engineer related. On the other hand, Jiang et al.[10] propose a feature-based solution that allows a developer to remove certain features in Java bytecode by performing static analysis. Further, Jiang et al.[9] introduce an automatic approach to statically analyze and remove unused code in both Java application and JRE.

Major impact of bloating is felt in the realm of software security, particularly in code-reuse attacks where an attacker reuses existing code in the memory to achieve malicious computation. ROP [3, 5, 14] and COOP [15] are examples of code-reuse attacks. Modern defenses have focused on enforcing runtime program properties (e.g., CFI [2], SPI [12, 13]) to defeat code-reuse attacks. Generally, debloating reduces the amount of code that needs protection, and therefore strengthens the overall security of the system.

The techniques used in this paper, particularly virtual-machine introspection on Qemu has been previously explored (e.g., DE-CAF [8]) to provide analysis frameworks that allow fine-grained introspection. These solutions modify the code cache to embed callbacks to analysis code such that timely analysis can be performed upon specific events in the guest OS. While we borrow ideas from those solutions, our approach is unique in the sense that we do not modify individual translation blocks. Instead, we rely on monitoring the translation cache.

6 CONCLUSION

We conducted experiments to measure bloat at multiple levels of abstraction—user mode programs, managed execution (JVM and Python interpreter) and the OS kernel. For the user level programs, we also measure the static lower bound for bloat. Our findings show that (1) bloating is pervasive and a cross-layer problem, and (2) there exists significant research space for systematic debloating at multiple layers in the execution stack.

7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their feedback. This research was supported in part by Office of Naval Research Grant #N00014-17-1-2929. Any opinions, findings and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies.

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